Advances in Cryptographic Protocols and Game Theory

The field of cryptographic protocols and game theory is rapidly evolving, with a focus on developing new solution concepts and consensus models that can ensure secure and trustworthy interactions in decentralized systems. Researchers are exploring new approaches to analyze and design cryptographic protocols, taking into account the complexities of real-world implementations and the need for robust security guarantees. Notably, innovative concepts such as pseudo-Nash equilibria and behavior-driven consensus models are being proposed to address the challenges of decentralized finance and blockchain governance. Furthermore, advancements in threshold signature schemes and secure payment verification protocols are improving the security and scalability of digital currencies. Some noteworthy papers in this area include: Proof-of-Behavior, which introduces a novel consensus model that gives each action a layered utility score and adapts validator weights using recent scores. Threshold Signatures for Central Bank Digital Currencies, which explores the application of threshold signature schemes to enhance the security of CBDC implementations.

Sources

Pseudo-Equilibria, or: How to Stop Worrying About Crypto and Just Analyze the Game

Proof-of-Behavior: Behavior-Driven Consensus for Trustworthy Decentralized Finance

Threshold Signatures for Central Bank Digital Currencies

FastSet: Parallel Claim Settlement

All Proof of Work But No Proof of Play

Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions and XOR

The Secrets Must Not Flow: Scaling Security Verification to Large Codebases (extended version)

Horus: A Protocol for Trustless Delegation Under Uncertainty

Safe Low Bandwidth SPV: A Formal Treatment of Simplified Payment Verification Protocols and Security Bounds

A new efficient RPKI Design

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