The field of mechanism design and game theory is experiencing significant growth, with recent research focusing on developing more robust and efficient mechanisms for various applications. A key direction is the study of stable matchings and allocations, with researchers exploring new frameworks and techniques to improve the solvability and optimality of these problems. Another area of interest is the design of mechanisms that can handle complex informational constraints and uncertainties, such as those arising from non-monetary allocations and dynamic environments. Additionally, there is a growing emphasis on developing algorithms and methods that can compute optimal or near-optimal solutions in a timely and efficient manner. Overall, the field is moving towards the development of more sophisticated and practical mechanisms that can be applied to real-world problems. Noteworthy papers include: The work on Robust Equilibria in Shared Resource Allocation, which proposes a novel mechanism that achieves both Bayes-Nash equilibria and robust guarantees for individual agent utilities. The study on Online Resource Sharing, which obtains a significant improvement on the robustness of online resource sharing by using a simple randomized bidding strategy.