The field of fair allocation and mechanism design is experiencing significant developments, with a focus on innovative solutions that balance efficiency, fairness, and truthfulness. Recent research has explored new connections between truthful mechanisms for goods and chores, enabling the characterization of truthful mechanisms and the derivation of tight guarantees for various fairness notions. Additionally, researchers have investigated the design of strategyproof mechanisms for facility location problems, stable matching under location restrictions, and fair allocation in bandit settings. These advances have led to a better understanding of the trade-offs between fairness, efficiency, and truthfulness in various allocation problems. Noteworthy papers in this area include:

• A study on the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating chores among strategic agents, which discovers various connections between truthful good and chore allocations.
• A paper on truthful facility location with candidate locations and limited resources, which presents a randomized mechanism with a tight approximation ratio.
• Research on bandit max-min fair allocation, which proposes an algorithm with an asymptotic regret bound and provides a regret lower bound.
• A revisit of weighted envy-freeness, which proposes a new concept called SumAvg-envy-freeness and studies its computational complexity in classic problems.